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Abstract:  
This article challenges the ‘Equal Merit Principle’, introduced to the judicial appointment 
process by the Crime and Courts Act 2013. The author argues that this principle does not take 
diversity seriously enough and none of its possible justifications stand up to close scrutiny. 
The author also claims that the doctrine that judges should be appointed solely on the basis of 
merit is either wrong, for the very same reasons as the Equal Merit Principle, or rather 







 Senior Lecturer, University of Aberdeen. The author would like to thank Abbe Brown and Alan Paterson for 
their helpful comments. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the author. All websites cited were last 
accessed on 15 December 2016. 
Introduction 
 
It is commonplace that the UK Supreme Court (previously the Appellate Committee of the 
House of Lords) is less diverse than the highest courts of most Western democracies.1 The 
typical judge of the Court is a white, heterosexual male from an upper middle-class 
background, and was privately educated and graduated from Oxford or Cambridge. The 
professional background of the justices also shows a fairly consistent pattern. Most of them 
come from a small number of commercial chambers based in London. 2 By the 1990s this 
homogeneity ‘had become the subject of growing concern as the lack of diversity in the 
make-up of the Court increasingly stood in contrast to the changing composition of many 
other public institutions.’3  
Since then the judicial appointment process has undergone a major change. The 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (hereafter CRA) has replaced the old ‘tapping on the 
shoulder’ method of appointment with a transparent and open process. Increasing diversity 
has become one of the declared objectives of the legal system4 and the issue has attracted 
serious attention from lawyers, academics and politicians alike.5 Today, there is a lively 
public debate about how the judiciary can be made more diverse.6 The Judicial Appointments 
 
1 For comparative data, see C. Thomas, ‘Judicial Diversity in the United Kingdom and Other Jurisdictions’ 
(2005) <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/judicial-
institute/files/Judicial_Diversity_in_the_UK_and_other_jurisdictions.pdf>; A. Paterson and C. Paterson, 
‘Guarding the Guardians? Towards an Independent, Accountable and Diverse Senior Judiciary’ (2012) 
<https://pure.strath.ac.uk/portal/files/14551390/guarding_the_guardians.pdf>; P.H. Russell and K. Malleson 
(eds), Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Critical Perspectives from around the World (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press 2006). 
2 For the social and professional makeup of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, see Kate Malleson, 
‘Appointments to the House of Lords: Who Goes Upstairs’ in L. Blom-Cooper, B. Dickson and G. Drewry 
(eds), The Judicial House of Lords: 1876-2009 (Oxford: OUP 2009). 
3 ibid, 114. 
4 For a recent view on the issue, see ‘UK’s top judge unveils plan to make supreme court more diverse.’ 
Guardian, 21 November 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/nov/21/lord-neuberger-uks-top-judge-
unveils-supreme-court-diversity-plan-retirement>. 
5 For a detailed survey of the debate, see Annex iii to the ‘The Report of the Advisory Panel on Judicial 
Diversity 2010’ <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/judicial-
institute/files/Report_of_the_Advisory_Panel_on_Judicial_Diversity.pdf>. 
6 See, for instance, House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, ‘Judicial Appointments’ 25th Report 
Commission (hereinafter JAC) has both a statutory duty and a well-defined action plan to 
encourage diversity.7 Access to regularly updated data on the make-up of the judiciary is 
freely available and makes the monitoring of appointments possible. As a result of these 
efforts, the British judiciary has become more diverse than it was before.8 
As part of these developments, the Crime and Courts Act 2013 has introduced a new 
element into the selection process, the so-called Equal Merit Principle. Although judges 
should be selected ‘solely on merit’9, if two candidates have equal merit, this process allows 
the selecting body to prefer one of them over the other for the purpose of increasing 
diversity.10  
The aim of this paper is not to assess the success or failure of all these efforts to 
advance diversity.11 More generally, I do not tackle the practical question of how the 
judiciary can be made more diverse. Instead, I focus on the theoretical question of how much 
diversity is desirable. I will specifically challenge the Equal Merit Principle and argue that it 
does not take diversity seriously enough and none of the possible justifications of the 
principle stand up to close scrutiny. I also claim that the ‘Solely on Merit Principle’ is either 
wrong, for the very same reasons as the Equal Merit Principle, or rather uninformative since 
it fails to give sufficient guidance to those who select judges. 
The rest of this introduction makes some preliminary points, while the remaining part 
of the paper is divided into three sections. The next section distinguishes three possible 
readings of the Equal Merit Principle and argues that none of them are able to make the 
principle attractive. After that, I challenge an alternative argumentative strategy developed 
 
(2010–12) http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201012/ldselect/ldconst/272/272.pdf. 
7 ‘Judicial Appointments Commission - Diversity Strategy’ <https://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/diversity-strategy>. 
8 ‘Judicial Diversity Statistics 2016’ <https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/judicial-
diversity-statistics-2016-2.pdf>. 
9 CRA s 63(2). Supreme Court justices must be appointed on merit. s 27(5). 
10 CRA ss 63(4), 27(5A)(b) 
11 See, for instance, K. Malleson, ‘Diversity in the Judiciary: The Case For Positive Action’ (2009) 36 Journal of 
Law and Society 376; L. Barmes and K. Malleson, ‘The Legal Profession as Gatekeeper to the Judiciary: Design 
Faults in Measures to Enhance Diversity’ (2011) 74 MLR 245. 
most skilfully by Erika Rackley, which aims to eliminate the conflict between merit and 
diversity. In the final section, I address some potential objections to my position and fine-tune 
the main argument of the paper by introducing a few qualifications.  
In the course of my analysis, I will set aside two possible objections to the Equal 
Merit Principle. First, some scholars have argued that merit is so subjective that it is 
impossible to use it as a selection criterion.12 If correct, this argument challenges not only the 
Equal Merit Principle but the very possibility of a merit-based appointment system. The point 
is not that we do not have even a rough consensus on what merit means — the problem is 
rather that merit is a multidimensional concept. It has different aspects and reasonable people 
will disagree on how much weight should be assigned to each of those aspects.13 For 
example, the criteria that were developed by the JAC include both intellectual capacity and 
communication skills. We can agree that both attributes are important but might disagree on 
how we should balance them. Even though such an objection is certainly reasonable, once we 
commit ourselves to a particular (not necessarily the only reasonable) weighted balance of the 
components of merit, the criteria settled on can be in principle consistently applied to all 
individual cases.   
The second objection is more limited since it does not challenge the very idea of a 
merit-based system; instead, it targets specifically the Equal Merit Principle. It says that two 
candidates cannot have equal merit because if we dig deep enough, we will always find 
something that differentiates two candidates. If the decision-makers had infinite time and 
scrutinised only two candidates, they could probably spot some difference. However, when a 
multi-member institution evaluates many candidates, the selection exercise might result in a 
tie and time-constraints might make further scrutiny practically impossible. The Report of the 
 
12 D. Roithmayr, ‘Deconstructing the Distinction between Bias and Merit’ (1997) 85 California Law Review 
1449; R. Delgado, ‘Rodrigo’s Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Action’ (1994) 83 Georgia Law Journal 
1711. 
13 See n 6 above, [86]. 
House of Lords Select Committee itself addresses this issue: ‘It seems likely that in large 
assessment exercises it would not always be possible to rank every candidate in strict order of 
merit and that a number of candidates may be considered to be of equal merit.’14  
As a final preliminary note, it is worth keeping in mind that diversity has not only 
various justifications but also different forms. It is important to note from the outset that my 
argument is primarily about cognitive diversity. Each individual has a distinctive cognitive 
toolkit that comprises concepts through which the individual perceives and interprets the 
world, heuristics that help them to solve problems and predictive models that enable them to 
predict future events and outcomes.15 The more tools in the toolkit of a certain group, the 
more diverse the group is from a cognitive perspective. Social diversity (the social make-up 
of a group) is analytically distinct from cognitive diversity.16 However, I will assume that 
there is a correlation between the two forms of diversity. People with different social 
background have different experiences that shape how they perceive the world and what 
kinds of cognitive tools they have. Because of this correlation, I will usually use the term 
diversity in this paper without any adjectives, even though I am aware of the conceptual 
distinction between cognitive and social diversity.   
 
The Critique of the Equal Merit Principle 
Challenging the Equal Merit Principle 
The Equal Merit Principle is highly plausible at face value. Actually, it seems so 
uncontroversial that we do not usually require any further justification for it. This might 
explain why once we challenge the principle, we find that it is not only vulnerable to many 
 
14 ibid, [99]. 
15 Here I draw on S.E. Page, The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, 
Schools, and Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2008) 22. 
16 For an analogous distinction between explicit and tacit diversity, see R.J. Cahill-O’Callaghan, ‘Reframing the 
Judicial Diversity Debate: Personal Values and Tacit Diversity’ (2015) 35 Legal Studies 1. 
objections but also unsupported by robust arguments.  I contend that to be successful, the 
advocates of the principle should establish any of the following three premises: (1) diversity 
is not an epistemic asset; (2) even if diversity is an epistemic asset, no trade-off between 
diversity and merit can ever be justified; (3) merit should always trump diversity, even if it 
makes the epistemic performance of courts suboptimal. What is really striking is that the 
proponents of the principle do not provide robust arguments for any of the aforementioned 
three theses.   
The claim that appointment must be based solely on merit seems almost tautological. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, merit is ‘the quality of being particularly good 
or worthy, especially so as to deserve praise or reward.’ Attributing merit to a candidate is not 
a neutral description of the candidate’s qualities but a coupling of this description with a 
moral judgment concerning whether the candidate deserves to be appointed. The proposition 
that a non-meritorious or the less meritorious candidate should be appointed seems to suggest 
either cynicism or a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the selection exercise. All 
this is reflected in the House of Lords Select Committee’s report that states: ‘It is axiomatic 
that judges must be appointed on merit [emphasis mine].’17  
We can only make progress in the analysis if we decouple the characterisation of the 
candidate’s qualities (this is itself an evaluative exercise) from the judgment of whether the 
candidate in question deserves to be appointed. For that purpose, let me replace the morally-
laden concept of merit with the more neutral concept of competence (let us stipulate that 
competence encompasses all the criteria of merit developed by the JAC18) and suspend 
judgment on whether the most competent candidate deserves to be appointed. Decoupling the 
question of judicial competence from the final judgement on who should be appointed forces 
us to articulate the unstated assumption of the argument and explain why and how much 
 
17 See n 6 above, [83]. 
18 According to the JAC, merit has five main components: intellectual capacity, personal qualities, an ability to 
understand and deal fairly, authority and communication skills, efficiency.  
competence matters.  
 
Diversity has no epistemic value 
My contention is that the Equal Merit Principle has three possible justifications. I will address 
them in turn and conclude that none of them hold water. Let me call the first view that 
provides the most straightforward explanation of the principle the simple view on judicial 
appointments. The simple view has four tenets: (1) The judicial appointment process has to 
maximise the epistemic performance of courts; (2) Non-epistemic considerations should play 
a role in the process only as tiebreakers, and should not be balanced against epistemic 
considerations; (3) Diversity is not an epistemic asset; (4) Competence is the only 
epistemically relevant consideration, therefore, the maximisation of competence maximises 
the epistemic performance of courts. Let me spell out these claims in more detail.  
As I said, once we give up the view that the Solely on Merit Principle is axiomatic, 
we must articulate why competence matters. The simple view answers this question by 
referring to the epistemic performance of courts: courts as institutions have to be able to 
collect and process information, interpret legal rules and principles, analyse legal concepts, 
and assess legal arguments. As a society, we expect courts to make good decisions. We very 
often disagree on what constitutes a good decision in a particular case. However, for the 
purposes of the argument, we do not have to agree on what constitutes a good decision in 
every single case; it is sufficient to agree on the assumption that a more competent judiciary 
will generally make better decisions than a less competent one.19 According to the simple 
view, competence is important for instrumental reasons: a judiciary with more competent 
judges will be more likely to produce better decisions. Let us call this first tenet of the simply 
 
19 For a more detailed explanation of how we can judge the epistemic credentials of an institution without 
agreeing on the correctness of particular decisions made by the institution, see A. Vermeule, Law and the Limits 
of Reason (Oxford: OUP 2009) 8. 
view the Performance Maximising Principle.  
The second tenet of the simple view is that epistemic performance is not only a 
relevant concern but the most important consideration. The selection process, therefore, can 
take into account other reasons only when we run out of epistemic considerations. If, ex 
hypothesi, we cannot make a decision on epistemic grounds, but we have to make a decision 
anyway, we can rely on some other form of consideration.      
For the purposes of my critique, the third tenet of the simple view is crucial. The 
advocates of the simple view are certainly correct to emphasise that we often use non-
epistemic arguments to advance diversity. It is not unreasonable to think that if the judiciary 
is not diverse enough, many people will perceive it as a body that reflects the views of and 
protects the interests of a narrow elite, and that cannot possibly understand their concerns. 
People will accept judicial decisions more easily and respect them more if judges are in a 
meaningful sense like them. Let us call this the argument from public confidence.  
Second, one could argue that diversity is important not because of how the public, in 
general, perceives the judiciary, but because it is what justice to individual candidates 
requires. From here, the argument can take two forms. According to the first version of the 
argument, since talent is distributed roughly evenly in society, the current allocation of 
judicial offices is certainly unjust. For instance, female judges can be just as good as male 
judges, so the fact that they are significantly underrepresented in the higher echelons of the 
judiciary can be explained only by the injustice of the system. If women had an equal 
opportunity to become judges, so the argument runs, the number of male and female judges 
would be roughly the same. This argument suggests that we should reach out to formerly 
underrepresented groups, but the selection must be made solely on competence. As the 
Report of the Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity puts it: ‘You should not be looking for 
unusual talent, but looking for talent in unusual places.’20 Although this position certainly has 
merit, it does not help me test the Equal Merit Principle; rather, it only gives us guidance on 
how we can maximise competence but says nothing about whether a trade-off between 
competence and diversity can ever be justified.  
The second version of the equal opportunity argument suggests that equal opportunity 
requires more than reaching out to formerly underrepresented groups and broadening the pool 
of candidates. Since certain groups were systematically excluded from judicial offices in the 
past, they deserve to be appointed, even if that means that, at least temporarily, not always the 
most competent candidate will be appointed.21    
I will not discuss the merits of these arguments. For us, the crux of the question is not 
whether there are cogent non-epistemic reasons for diversity, but whether diversity is also 
important for epistemic reasons. One could expect that the simple view has well-articulated 
and robust reasons to substantiate its third tenet that answers the question in the negative. But 
this is not the case. Actually, the simple view flies in the face of a fairly solid expert 
consensus. Both the Report of the Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity22 and the Report of 
the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution,23 drawing on the expertise of 
leading academics and judges, conclude that diversity does have epistemic relevance.24  The 
latter states that ‘Judging is a complex activity: it is necessary for judges to understand the 
wide array of concerns and experiences of those appearing before them. A more diverse 
judiciary can bring different perspectives to bear on the development of the law and to the 
 
20 n 5 above, [23]. 
21 For an overview of the different forms of affirmative action, see K. Malleson, ‘Rethinking the Merit Principle 
in Judicial Selection’ (2006) 33 Journal of Law and Society 126, 130–135; K. Malleson, ‘Diversity in the 
Judiciary: The Case For Positive Action’ n 10 above, 393–397. For an additional line of non-epistemic 
argument, see D. B. Wilkins, ‘From“ Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to“ Diversity Is Good for Business”: The 
Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar’ (2004) 117 Harvard Law 
Review 1548. 
22 n 5 above, [26]. 
23 n 6 above, [70]. 
24 For an even more detailed position on the issue, see Thomas n 1 above, 57–58. 
concept of justice itself.’25 
My contention is that one’s position on the importance of diversity will depend to a 
great extent on one’s view of the nature of adjudication. It is reasonable to expect that people 
with different views on adjudication will assign diversity different weights. However, I also 
claim that no plausible view of what judges are doing is consistent with the position that 
diversity has no epistemic value. I will discuss the epistemic benefits of diversity under three 
headings.     
The diversity of legal expertise. The discourse on judicial diversity often neglects the 
importance of professional diversity. The reason for this may be that there is not always a 
strong correlation between the diversity of legal expertise and social diversity. One can easily 
imagine, for example, a professionally more diverse UK Supreme Court without necessarily 
changing the social make-up of the institution. However, since I am more interested in 
cognitive than social diversity, the diversity of legal expertise is directly relevant to my 
argument.  
The appointment process itself takes into consideration one type of professional 
diversity. According to section 27(8) of the CRA, ‘in making selections for the appointment 
of judges of the [Supreme] Court the commission must ensure that between them the judges 
will have knowledge of, and experience of practice in, the law of each part of the United 
Kingdom.’ Although this practice might have other than epistemic justifications (I find the 
argument from public confidence very relevant here),26 the Act seems to justify the above 
requirement entirely on epistemic grounds: the candidates do not have to be, for instance, 
Scottish, but have to be familiar with Scots law.  
If expertise in the law of different jurisdictions is important, it is unclear why the 
 
25 ibid. 
26 As Alan Paterson and Chris Paterson put it, “This requirement is designed to ensure that there is continued 
representation from both Scotland and Northern Ireland on the Supreme Court.” Paterson and Paterson n 1 
above, 26. However, the provision in question speaks only about expertise on Scots law and not the 
representation of Scotland.  
expertise in different areas of law would be irrelevant. One could argue that the 
aforementioned example is misleading since English and Scottish candidates do not compete 
with each other but compete for two differently defined positions. Just like a goalkeeper in a 
football team, or a conductor in an orchestra, Scottish justices have a specific job description 
that is slightly different from that of the other members of the group. When one of the two 
positions for Scottish justices becomes vacant, the selection committee is required to choose 
the most competent candidate among the ones who have the requisite expertise in Scots law. 
However, in many cases we do not have such fixed roles within a group and, therefore, have 
to advance diversity among people who compete for the same position. For instance, there is 
not a separate position in the Supreme Court for criminal lawyers or international lawyers. 
But it does not mean that their special expertise would not be an epistemic asset for the court. 
If that is true, competence and diversity might pull in different directions when lawyers with 
different expertise compete for the same position.  
The diversity of life experiences. It is a truism that in the adjudicative process judges 
have to apply legal rules to the facts of a particular case. This process requires judges to 
understand complex factual situations, the significance of facts and also causal mechanisms 
between certain states of affairs. I wholeheartedly agree with the statement quoted above 
from the Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution that judging is a 
complex activity. This complexity explains why the relevance of cognitive diversity cannot 
be limited to the diversity of legal expertise.  
I believe that a case often cited in the literature brings home this point very nicely. In 
Safford Unified School Dist. #1 v Redding,27 the US Supreme Court addressed the question of 
whether the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution prohibits school officials from strip-
searching students suspected of possessing drugs in violation of school policy. Many 
 
27 557 U.S. 364 (2009) 
commentators noticed that the judges had strikingly different attitudes towards the strip-
search of a 13-year-old girl during the oral hearing. It was Justice Ginsburg, then the only 
female member of the court, who explained to her male colleagues why strip-searching 
constitutes a harm that is constitutionally relevant. As she said about her male colleagues to 
USA Today, ‘They have never been a 13-year-old girl. . . . It’s a very sensitive age for a girl. 
I didn’t think that my colleagues, some of them, quite understood.’28 The important point 
here is that Justice Ginsburg’s distinctive cognitive toolkit helped the court to make a better 
(or at least more informed) decision. However, her special contribution had nothing to do 
with her legal expertise. Rather, it was related to her better understanding of the moral 
significance of certain facts (why strip-searching causes moral harm). And since the law itself 
made the moral significance of those facts legally relevant, Justice Ginsburg’s knowledge 
helped the court to reach a decision that is not only morally but also legally better than its 
alternative.29  
This case also supports two additional points. First, we should commend the male 
justices who listened to Justice Ginsburg for their openness. This is a nice illustration of the 
quality that the JAC calls ‘an ability to understand’ or the ‘ability to treat everyone with 
respect and sensitivity whatever their background.’ However, as the case illustrates, the 
ability to understand the experience of other people is not the same as having the same 
experience for oneself. A good decision, in that case, required both someone having the 
relevant experience and others having the ability to understand that experience.  
Second, this case also illustrates that the diversity of life experiences can be relevant 
 
28 J. Biskupic, ‘Ginsburg: Court Needs Another Woman’ USA today (5 October 2009) 
<http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2009-05-05-ruthginsburg_N.htm>. 
29 For evidence that race also shapes how judges interpret social reality, see S.A. Ifill, ‘Racial Diversity on the 
Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence’ (2000) 57 Washington and Lee Law Review 405; R. 
Delgado and J. Stefancic, ‘Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error’ (1990) 69 Texas Law 
Review 1929. 
not only in exceptionally hard cases when we run out of legal rules.30 It can become 
important in every single case when we subsume the facts of the case under a general rule.  
The general importance of cognitive diversity. The case for the epistemic importance 
of diversity is further corroborated by studies from other fields.31 Although judicial decision-
making certainly has its own distinctive characteristics, there are also many features that it 
shares with other forms of decision-making. It would be narrow-minded legal parochialism to 
ignore the relevance of this literature to judicial decision-making.32 To make the trivial point, 
judges are also human beings. As such, they are not immune to certain cognitive biases or 
motivational failures.33 Judges also rely on powerful cultural narratives to describe and make 
sense of social reality.34 Although as the JAC criteria make clear, ‘an ability to understand’ is 
an important judicial virtue, psychological research shows that even the most open-minded 
and intelligent people are vulnerable to what is called the confirmation bias.35 People tend to 
seek and interpret evidence not simply in light of, but also to confirm, their existing beliefs. 
We can counteract the distortive effects of the confirmation bias more effectively by a diverse 
judiciary than by relying on the open-mindedness of judges.  
 
30 In my view, the Report on the Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity underestimates the importance of 
diversity by focusing on judicial discretion. As the Report says, This [the diversity of perspectives] is 
particularly important where there is scope for the exercise of judicial discretion or where public interest 
considerations are a factor. See n 5 above, [26]. 
31 The most directly relevant studies are arguably those that are dealing with the importance of diversity in 
political decision-making. See, for instance, H. Landemore, Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective 
Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2013); H. Landemore and J. Elster 
(eds), Collective Wisdom: Principles and Mechanisms (Cambridge: CUP 2012). 
32 For the very same reason, the argument that is developed in the present paper also has implications far beyond 
the issue of judicial appointments. However, the question of to what extent it can be transferred to other legal 
contexts would require contextual analysis that is beyond the scope of the present article. To briefly illustrate 
this point, the diversity of student bodies has been a central issue in American affirmative action cases. 
However, there are salient differences between the student body of a university and a high court, such as the UK 
Supreme Court. For instance, although a more diverse student body is an epistemic asset, the members of a 
student body do not have to act together as do the members of a court. The argument about problem solving then 
applies only to situations where the members of the collective have to find a solution to an issue by acting 
together. This example shows that although some arguments for diversity apply to both cases, my conclusion 
about judicial diversity cannot be automatically transferred to other contexts. The difference emphasised above 
might tip the balance of arguments differently in the two cases, even if diversity is relevant in both contexts.       
33 C. Guthrie, J.J. Rachlinski and A.J. Wistrich, ‘Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases’ (2007) 93 
Cornell Law Review 1. 
34 For the role of cultural narratives, see R. Delgado, ‘Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for 
Narrative’ (1989) 87 Michigan Law Review 2411. 
35 R.B. Mahzarin and A.G. Greenwald, Blindspot: Hidden Biases of Good People (New York: Bantam 2016). 
I find Scott E. Page’s findings particularly relevant for assessing the relevance of 
diversity. Page first developed an agent-based model, a computer simulation program that 
social scientists often use to study complex and dynamic social systems to examine how a 
group of agents with different cognitive toolkits solve problems together.36 The agent-based 
model systematically generated the counterintuitive outcome that a diverse group of agents 
outperforms a homogeneous group even if the latter consists of individually more able agents. 
Later he is his colleague gave a formal mathematical proof of this insight.37 Their central 
claim is that  as far as problem-solving is concerned, under some non-unrealistic conditions, 
‘if we have two groups of problem-solvers of equal individual ability, one of them is 
homogeneous, and the other is diverse, then the diverse collection will, on average, 
outperform the homogeneous collection.’38  
The gist of their explanation is that in problem-solving, a group of homogeneous 
problem-solvers will be stuck at the same place, and therefore the group cannot perform 
better than the best individual in the group. By contrast, if people have different perspectives 
or heuristics, it is likely that they will come up with individually different optimal solutions. 
In that case, by acting together one can improve on others’ optimal solution. This 
improvement means that the group as a whole can perform better than the best member of the 
group.39  
It is important to emphasise here that Page does not offer empirical proof that a 
collection of random people outperforms the collection of the best people under certain 
 
36 For agent based modelling in general, see N. Gilbert, Agent-Based Models (Quantitative Applications in the 
Social Sciences) (Los Angeles: SAGE 2007); R.A. Axelrod, Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of 
Competition and Collaboration (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1997); J.M. Epstein and R.L. 
Axtell, Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up (Complex Adaptive Systems) 
(Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press 1996). 
37 L. Hong and S.E. Page, ‘Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers Can Outperform Groups of High-Ability 
Problem Solvers’ (2004) 101 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 
16385. 
38 n 15 above, 157. 
39 The argument from better problem-solving is also part of what is usually called the „business case for 
diversity”. See, for instance, Wilkins n 21 above, 1576.  
conditions. Rather, his analysis provides a formal mathematical proof that his theorems apply 
to the mathematical representations of cognitive toolkits. Empirical research cannot be 
applied directly to the agents of computational models, but only to human beings who also 
possess diverse cognitive toolboxes. But once we understand the logic of diversity, as Page 
calls it, we are also better equipped to ask the proper empirical questions. For instance, even 
if a group is socially diverse, we cannot expect the benefits of cognitive diversity if the 
members of the group do not have different cognitive tools. Similarly, we cannot expect that 
a more diverse group will outperform a homogenous one if their job is not problem-solving 
(or prediction), or the members of the group do not cooperate. 
 Justice Ginsburg’s example in Safford Unified School Dist. #1 v Redding provides a 
good illustration of this theory. Her special contribution in the case cannot be explained by 
her above average competence. She could have contributed to the decision-making with 
something special, even if her competence had been below average. Her unique contribution, 
in that case, was more useful for the court as a whole than an additional male judge’s 
contribution could have been, even if the latter had been more competent than her.    
In light of the aforementioned arguments, the simple view seems untenable. If the 
conclusion of the simple view, the Equal Merit Principle, is appealing, it is not appealing 
because diversity is not an epistemic asset, but for a different reason.  
 
Competence always trumps diversity 
The second possible argumentative strategy preserves the first two tenets of the simple view. 
It adheres to the Performance Maximising Principle and also claims that non-epistemic 
considerations should not compete with epistemic ones. However, it gives up the third tenet 
of the simple view and concedes that cognitive diversity has epistemic value. 
But how is it possible to hold simultaneously (1) the Performance Maximising 
Principle, (2) the epistemic significance of diversity, and (3) the Equal Merit Principle? There 
is only one way to reconcile these three theses: one has to establish that although diversity is 
an epistemic asset, judicial competence always trumps diversity in the epistemic dimension. 
To put it otherwise, the Performance Maximising Principle itself requires a strict lexical order 
between judicial competence and diversity; that is, it requires us to maximise judicial 
competence before we move on to increase diversity.40  
Although it is theoretically possible to defend the Equal Merit Principle this way, 
there are no scholarly works widely available that pursue this strategy. If one concedes that 
diversity is an epistemic asset, it seems to be a very counterintuitive position to hold that no 
gain in diversity (no matter how big this gain is) can ever compensate for the smallest 
possible loss in judicial competence. It is not sufficient for the advocates of the Equal Merit 
Principle to prove that judicial competence is generally a more important epistemic asset than 
diversity. What they must establish is that no trade-off between these two considerations can 
ever be justified.  
However, this position seems to be not only counterintuitive and unsubstantiated by 
the advocates of the Equal Merit Principle, but also wrong. Scott E. Page has also 
convincingly demonstrated that as far as problem-solving is concerned, under certain non-
unrealistic conditions, diversity is more important than individual ability. As his Diversity 
Trumps Ability Theorem says: ‘a randomly selected collection of problem solvers 
outperforms a collection of the best individual problem solvers’.41 But diversity may also 
trump ability, even if not all the conditions are met. The previous subsection has already shed 
light on why a diverse group can outperform less diverse ones, even if the average 
competence of the latter group is higher: by acting together the members of the diverse group 
can improve on the optimal solutions of the other group members. By contrast, a 
 
40 I borrow the concept of lexical order from Rawls. See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: OUP 1973) 42–
43. 
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homogeneous group cannot perform better than the best member of the group, since their 
optimal solutions will be very similar.  
 
Justice always trumps epistemic performance 
The argument of my paper has reached an important juncture here. I have assumed so far that 
judicial competence is important because it contributes to the epistemic performance of 
courts. If neither of the above strategies managed to justify the Equal Merit Principle, we 
have no other option but to admit that the Equal Merit Principle is inconsistent with the 
Performance Maximising Principle. If the Equal Merit Principle is attractive, its appeal 
cannot be that it maximises the epistemic performance of courts. The advocates of the 
principle have to establish that it is attractive despite the fact that it can lead to epistemically 
suboptimal results.  
At this point, I am claiming only that the advocates of the Equal Merit Principle must 
offer some non-epistemic argument in defence of the principle; I am not claiming that there is 
only one logical possibility to do that. However, since they do not usually articulate non-
epistemic arguments in support of the principle, all I can do here is to engage with a line of 
non-epistemic argument that, in my view, provides the strongest support to the Equal Merit 
Principle. I will call this approach the argument from desert.  
When we appoint judges, we allocate very important and highly valued goods 
(judicial offices) among competing candidates. In the allocation of judicial offices, we require 
the government to act justly. The third argumentative strategy suggests that competence gives 
us guidance concerning what justice requires in the judicial appointment process. We should 
appoint the most competent candidates not because this maximises the epistemic performance 
of the courts, but because they are the ones who deserve to be appointed. Acting justly in this 
context means that we give every candidate his/her due. If Amy is more competent than 
Bella, Amy deserves to be appointed, and it would be unjust if we selected Bella.  
My contention is that although this argument is based on a particular conception of 
justice and not the instrumental role of competence, it is also parasitic on the Performance 
Maximising Principle. Therefore, once one admits that a purely competence-based system 
does not maximise epistemic performance, the argument from desert is also fatally 
undermined. Let me substantiate this claim.  
The principle of formal justice requires us to treat like cases alike. However, it leaves 
open the question of ‘likeness’. Therefore, we need to add substantive considerations to the 
formal principle of justice that determine the criteria of relevant similarity. In the context of 
the judicial appointment process, this means that we make assumptions about the function of 
the institution and define the relevant qualities in light of this function.  
A good knife should be able to cut. Therefore, the primary virtue of a knife is being 
sharp. It can have other virtues, but so far as it cannot cut, it is not a good knife. Similarly, a 
good football team has to win matches. Although one should commend the team if it helps 
social mobility, and praise players if they serve as role models for young kids, these are not 
the primary qualities by which players should be selected. Following this train of thought, the 
primary virtue of a good court is that it makes correct decisions. Although it is fortunate if the 
judicial appointment process increases the public confidence in courts, or gives opportunities 
to previously disadvantaged groups and improves social mobility, these considerations are 
secondary and external to the primary task of a court.  
The argument from desert, as I formulate it, derives its force from a particular view on 
the function of courts and how this function distinguishes between relevant and irrelevant 
qualities. The argument runs as follows: (1) The primary task of courts is to make correct 
decisions; (2) When judicial offices are allocated, only those qualities should be taken into 
account (or those qualities should have primacy) that are relevant for fulfilling the primary 
function of the court; (3) Competence is the only quality that is relevant for the primary 
function of the court. (4) If two candidates are not equally competent, justice requires us to 
appoint the more competent candidate. (5) If two candidates are equally competent, diversity 
can be used as a tiebreaker.  
The whole purpose of the previous analysis was to point out that even if we accept the 
premise of the argument that the selection process must maximise the epistemic performance 
of the court, competence is not the only consideration that is epistemically relevant.   
To further develop my argument, let me introduce a distinction that, in my view, 
should play a crucial role in the debate. I will use a thought-experiment for that purpose. Let 
us suppose that our challenge is to create the strongest possible court that consists of 12 
judges. In addition, let us assume that there is a broad consensus in the community that Amy 
is the most competent candidate. Finally, let us imagine that Amy can be easily cloned. Since 
Amy is the most competent candidate, we should definitely build the court around Amy. It is 
also plausible to claim that it would be good to have more clones of Amy on the court. 
However, the interesting question is whether we should populate the whole court with the 
clones of Amy. If cognitive diversity is an epistemic asset, we should answer this question in 
the negative. Even if Amy is, ex hypothesi, the most competent candidate, populating the 
court with her clones would not maximise the epistemic performance of the institution. We 
do not have to agree on how many clones of Amy would be optimal to have, as it is enough 
for our purposes to accept that at some point a judge with a different skill set would be more 
valuable for the court than an additional clone of Amy.  
This constructed example shows that one can evaluate a judge by two different 
criteria. Competence ranks the candidates in absolute terms. To answer the question of who 
the most competent judge is, let me offer a formal test: the most competent judge is the one 
who should be selected if the court consisted of only one member. In that case, the 
Performance Maximising Principle would always require us to select the most competent 
judge. However, the same logic does not apply if we build a multi-member institution. The 
second criterion, let us call it contribution, is a positional one; it is determined not only by the 
judge’s own competence, but also by the composition of the court, and the skill set of the 
other judges.42 The fact that Amy is more competent than Bella does not imply that her 
appointment will always maximise the epistemic performance of the court. Conversely, the 
fact that at some point we are justified in preferring Bella to Amy does not make Bella a more 
competent judge than Amy. 
If one equates merit with competence and, therefore, automatically attaches moral 
consequences to competence, they will easily jump to the conclusion that the most competent 
judge, in our example Amy, deserves to be appointed. However, the above argument shows 
that in those cases when Bella contributes more to the epistemic performance of the court 
than Amy, her appointment is based on considerations that are clearly relevant to the primary 
function of courts. In those cases, therefore, Bella deserves to be appointed. One might say 
that Amy is unlucky if her superior competence does not translate into superior contribution. 
She is unlucky because if the composition of the court had been slightly different, she could 
have been the one who is selected. However, this is not the same as saying that under such 
circumstances she is the one who deserves to be appointed.     
Let us assume that my argument is wrong and Amy does indeed deserve to be 
appointed, even if Bella could contribute more to the epistemic performance of the court. The 
advocates of the Equal Merit Principle would still have to face two difficulties. First, since 
they make a concession and are ready to balance epistemic performance against non-
epistemic considerations, the principle of desert should compete with other, rival 
interpretations of justice, like the second version of the argument from equal opportunity. The 
 
42 Alan Paterson and Chris Paterson call this the corporate competence of the institution. Paterson and Paterson 
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proponents of the Equal Merit Principle could no longer dismiss the competing conceptions 
of justice on the basis that they compromise epistemic performance, as their favoured 
principle would do exactly the same.  
Second, the Equal Merit Principle asks us not simply to balance desert against 
epistemic performance, but to give lexical priority to the former. According to the argument 
from desert, justice should prevail no matter how much we compromise the epistemic 
performance of courts. But the advocates of the principle do not explain why desert should 
always trump epistemic performance.   
Before turning to an alternative to my critique, I will conclude this section by spelling 
out an implication of my position. I rejected both the argument that competence should be the 
only criterion of judicial selection and that competence should always trump diversity or 
diversity should act as a tiebreaker. What role should competence play in the appointment 
process? One possibility is that competence should be treated as a threshold criterion.43 The 
selecting body must not appoint anybody who is below a certain standard. However, it does 
not always have to appoint the most competent candidate either. The threshold approach is 
fundamentally correct, but not precise enough. If it means that above a certain threshold of 
competence the appointing body should aim at maximising diversity, the threshold principle 
will produce suboptimal outcomes in a subclass of cases. The threshold principle, therefore, 
should not be used to maximise diversity. Rather, the selecting body should have the 
discretion to choose the candidate who most ideally balances competence and diversity.  
 
The Critique of the Merit in Diversity Principle 
 
In her book on judicial diversity, Erika Rackley mounted a sophisticated challenge to the 
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simple view on judicial appointments that significantly differs from my argument.44 She 
contends that those who challenge the simple view can follow three different argumentative 
strategies. First, they can admit that diversity is different from merit and challenge the merit 
principle directly. According to this strategy, merit is important, but there are other 
considerations that the appointment process should also take into consideration (Merit, 
dislodged). Second, they can argue that we should redefine the concept of merit since merit 
reflects the expectations of the present members of the judiciary and that this helps the 
judiciary to replicate itself (Merit, distorted). Finally, her own position claims to eliminate the 
conflict between merit and diversity. As she says, ‘merit and diversity stand and fall together’ 
(Merit in diversity).45   
Her position entails three important claims: (1) diversity is an important epistemic 
asset; (2) merit and diversity always pull in the same direction; (3) judges should be 
appointed solely on the basis of merit. Rackley is clearly right to criticise the simple view that 
rejects her first thesis. As my whole argument testifies, I completely agree with her on that 
issue.  
However, her second thesis misconstrues the relationship between merit and diversity. 
She says that ‘we are no longer faced with having to choose between advancing diversity and 
appointment on merit. Arguments for judicial diversity grounded in its contribution to the 
quality of judicial decision-making and arguments for appointment on merit point in the same 
direction.’46 
This position has two important weaknesses. The more fundamental one is that 
Rackley fails to distinguish between the two evaluative perspectives that I called competence 
and contribution, respectively. She conflates the question of the best judiciary with that of the 
best judge. ‘If we want the best possible judiciary, if we want a judiciary that is comprised of 
 
44 E. Rackley, Women, Judging and the Judiciary (Abingdon: Routledge 2014) 187–197. 
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individuals who are (on any view) the best, then we must also be committed to ensuring 
(among other things) that they are drawn from as varied and diverse backgrounds as 
possible.’47 However, this position does not do justice to the complexity of the problem we 
face. If we recall the story of Amy and Bella, Amy would be justified to claim that she is the 
better candidate, even if Bella could contribute more to the court’s performance. Rackley’s 
position cannot explain why Amy is justified in feeling unlucky and disappointed if Bella is 
appointed. Amy would be disappointed since she was rejected not because she lacked 
competence, but because of something that is entirely beyond her control: the competence of 
the other judges determines the value of her contribution to the court as an institution.      
More importantly, in the harmonious world envisaged by Rackley’s theory, the 
conflict between competence and diversity is not addressed directly. However, by making 
diversity a component of merit, that conflict does not disappear but is only reproduced within 
the criteria of merit. Individual competence and the diversity of the group can conflict even if 
they are both the components of merit, and this potential conflict must be at the heart of every 
sophisticated theory of judicial selection and must be addressed head on.  
The second problem follows directly from the first one. By ignoring the potential 
conflict between competence and diversity, Rackley does not realise that contribution, or 
what she calls merit, is a function of individual competence and collective diversity. She is 
correct to claim that, other things being equal, diversity contributes to the epistemic 
performance of courts. However, since contribution (or in her terminology, merit) is a 
function of diversity and competence, it does not follow that a more diverse court always 
outperforms a less diverse one. To put it differently, diversity and merit do not stand and fall 
together.  
Rackley’s theory is in a certain sense the mirror image of the simple view on judicial 
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appointments: neither of them admits the need for a trade-off. In order to maximise the 
epistemic performance of a court, the simple view instructs the selectors to maximise the 
competence of individual judges. According to the simple view, diversity cannot be balanced 
against judicial competence. By contrast, Rackley’s theory suggests that diversity does not 
have to be balanced against any relevant consideration. If that were true, we would maximise 
the epistemic performance of a court by maximising diversity. But this is simply not the case. 
Since there is a trade-off between individual competence and diversity, in some cases 
competence will trump diversity. In these cases, advancing diversity is detrimental to the 
overall epistemic performance of the court and the average contribution or merit of individual 
judges. The harmonious world Rackley envisages is, unfortunately, not a real option.  
I want to make clear at this point that I do not have strong theoretical objections to 
redefining merit per se and equating it with contribution instead of competence. As long as 
we keep in mind that contribution is a function of competence and diversity and that there is a 
trade-off between these two considerations, there is no inherent danger in this conceptual 
strategy. There is no practical difference between saying that (1) judges should be appointed 
on the basis of merit (understood as contribution); (2) the appointment procedure should take 
into consideration both merit (understood as competence) and diversity. My preference for 
the second approach is justified simply by linguistic conventions. It seems that competence is 
closer to our ordinary understanding of merit. The Report of the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the Constitution reflects this opinion.48   
This attitude is expressed most clearly by Lord Carswell’s comment on diversity. On 
interpreting diversity as an aspect of merit, he advises to: ‘take it into account, but do not call 
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chance of endorsement by the relevant decision-makers since in that case they could insist that judges are 
appointed solely on the basis of merit. However, this question is beyond the scope of present paper.  
it merit.’49 The Equal Merit Principle itself illustrates this understanding. Diversity can be a 
tiebreaker between equally meritorious candidates only if merit and diversity are distinct 
concepts. According to Rackley’s approach, the Equal Merit Principle is not wrong, but 
conceptually confused. The Equal Merit principle assumes the intelligibility of a two-stage 
procedure: in the first step, we determine the merit of the candidates. If they are equally 
meritorious, we can select the candidate who makes the court more diverse. However, if 
diversity is an aspect of merit, by choosing the candidate who makes the court more diverse, 
we also increase the merit of that candidate. Therefore, the two candidates were not of equal 
merit in the first place.  
 
Qualifying the argument 
In the rest of my paper, I address three potential objections to my position and fine-tune the 
argument accordingly. As I argued above, the significance one attributes to diversity is likely 
to be influenced by one’s view on the nature of the adjudicative process. Accordingly, my 
argument also makes some assumptions about the nature of the judicial work. Each objection 
I will address in this section challenges a hitherto unstated assumption of my position. To 
defend that position, I must establish that the assumptions behind my argument are correct, or 
at least more plausible than the alternatives.  
 
Judging is a solitary process 
The first objection says that my account fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the 
judicial process. The argument to the effect that cognitive diversity matters is predicated on 
the idea that judges work together as a team. However, so the argument runs, judging is better 
characterised as a solitary exercise. The decision of a court is fundamentally different from 
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the performance of a football team or an orchestra where the players or the members of the 
orchestra act together. Judges do not act together in the same way. When we are speaking 
about the decision of a court, we simply aggregate the votes of individual judges. 
Aggregating judicial votes does not require judges to form their opinion together. If that is 
correct, we maximise the epistemic performance of the court by maximising the competence 
of individual judges.  
Although I emphasised the importance of problem-solving for judicial decision-
making, and as far as problem-solving is concerned, judges indeed can profit from the 
benefits of diversity only if they act together, some benefits of cognitive diversity do not 
assume this strong form of collective action. An epistemically diverse group of people, for 
instance, makes more accurate predictions than a homogeneous one, even if the prediction of 
the group is simply the aggregation of individual predictions.50  
More importantly, I believe that the above description of judicial decision-making is 
highly unrealistic and that judging is a much more collective enterprise than the aggregative 
view suggests. Even if the final responsibility for an opinion lies with the individual judge, 
they are still confronted with the opinion of the other members of the panel. As Alan 
Paterson’s excellent book on the UK Supreme Court demonstrates, many of the justices 
consider themselves team-players who act together to solve difficult legal issues.51 It is true 
that some justices have a more individualistic approach to adjudication. But it is worth 
keeping in mind that even this individualistic approach only implies that those justices are 
less keen to influence their colleagues or to lobby for their own position than the less 
individualistic judges.52 It does not follow that these justices are not open to the arguments of 
their colleagues and are not ready to learn from them, and this is all we need to establish here.  
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In addition, the benefits of judicial diversity can derive not only from dialogue with 
other judges of the same panel (for the sake of convenience, let me call this dialogue 
internal.) Judges also engage with the opinions of the members of other courts (e.g., other 
domestic courts, foreign courts and international courts) and also with former members of the 
same court (these dialogues I will call external). It seems entirely unrealistic to assume that a 
judge would not learn from the opinions of others. If the judiciary as a whole is more diverse, 
each judge can profit from this diversity, even if a particular panel is relatively homogeneous.  
 
Reasonable disagreement 
Second, others could insist that I misunderstand the nature of judicial decision-making, albeit 
for reasons that are different from the ones suggested by the first objection. My argument for 
cognitive diversity assumes that judges engage in problem-solving and that any problem has 
one correct or right solution. However, this misrepresents the nature of legal dilemmas. 
Finding the cure for ebola, for instance, is a complex problem, but the criteria for success or 
failure are quite clear. Although judges also address complex issues, most of them, like the 
interpretation of abstract, value-laden human rights provisions, do not have one right answer. 
In these kinds of cases, a judge’s decision will reflect his or her values. The fact that more 
judges prefer one interpretation of an abstract, value-laden rights provision than another does 
not prove that the result preferred by the majority is more rational than the one preferred by 
the minority.  
The court’s decision will provisionally close the debate, but the outcome of the 
decision is not a ‘solution’ in the same sense as a medicine is a solution to a medical problem, 
or a mathematical proof is a solution to a mathematical conjecture. Although my argument so 
far has not taken into account the fact of reasonable moral disagreement, I do not believe that 
this undermines my position. On the contrary, it lends further support to it: it makes diversity 
not less, but much more important.53   
Controversial moral questions that are at the heart of many legal cases - human rights 
adjudication is the most obvious example - usually have more than one reasonable solution. 
The idea of reasonable disagreement does not assume that moral propositions cannot be true 
or objective. It claims only that most of our moral claims are inconclusively justified. A 
person with different experiences from mine can reasonably reject some of my moral claims 
even if I, building on my own experience, have good reasons to accept them. As Lord 
Sumption says in the legal context:  
 
No I don’t [think there is a single right answer in each appeal], I think there certainly 
is in some cases. I think that there may be a variety of satisfactory answers which are 
satisfactory to different degrees from different points of view and obviously a lot depends on 
your basic instinct, which is likely to colour your approach to cases generally which are the 
most important considerations.54   
 
My contention is that the fact of reasonable disagreement has far-reaching 
implications for the issue of judicial diversity. If we accept that in many cases judges face 
such dilemmas, we have to admit that the judicial process adjudicates between reasonable but 
inconclusively justified moral beliefs. In such cases, the importance of diversity does not 
derive from the fact that judges – cooperating with one another – are more likely to find the 
correct solution. But it would also be a mistake to conclude that in such cases diversity is 
important only because it increases the confidence of the public in the judiciary.    
In such cases, there is a more complex relationship between epistemic considerations 
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when all we have are different reasonable, but inconclusively justified, views. However, the importance of 
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and the legitimacy of judicial decision-making than my theory so far admits. Within the 
confines of this article, I cannot provide a sufficiently nuanced analysis of this relationship 
but, hopefully, can substantiate the claim that we have additional reasons to cherish 
diversity.55    
First, if on a controversial moral issue there are many reasonable but inconclusively 
justified positions, fairness requires that a wide range of positions be represented in the 
deliberative process.56 The argument from public confidence puts the emphasis on how the 
public perceives the judiciary and judicial decisions. However, it is not enough that the public 
accepts such decisions ex ante; their views should also be reflected in the decision-making 
process itself. On controversial moral questions judges do not have special expertise, and 
their views on such questions, similar to the views of many other people, are likely to be 
reasonable but not conclusively justified. Therefore representing a wide range of moral 
positions in judicial decision-making is important even if we cannot expect that judges – 
cooperating with each other – will find the correct solution.  
Second, even in modern, pluralist societies where we disagree on many issues, it is 
conceivable that at least some moral principles are publicly justified, that is, justified to all 
members of the society. My contention is that such publicly justified principles have stronger 
legitimacy than those that can be justified only to a segment of society. If this is correct, 
political institutions should at least aim at justifying their authoritative decisions by appealing 
to publicly justified principles. To put it differently, they must be capable of tracking those 
principles. However, an institution that is not diverse enough cannot lay a claim even in 
principle that it is capable of doing that.  
Third, even in those cases where we cannot hope that the truth will come to the 
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surface through discussion, or when it is impossible to find publicly justified principles, the 
presence of different reasonable positions has crucial epistemic significance: it tends to make 
those views more reflective. As Mill’s classic argument pointed out, without robust dissent 
even the views that are true can degenerate into dead dogmas.57 There is empirical evidence 
that when there is a ‘different voice’ in a judicial panel, for instance, a judge from a minority 
background, the dynamics within the panel changes and judges will be willing to consider a 
broader array of considerations.58 Dissenting opinions can force the judges in the majority to 
clarify points that they might have previously regarded as unproblematic or that they might 
have left unarticulated. They may also recognise the need to engage with arguments that they 
had not otherwise considered. This process improves the quality of arguments even if the 
process ends with each party remaining unconvinced by the arguments of the other.  
The upshot of this is that the presence of different perspectives within the judiciary 
not only (1) makes judges better problem solvers but (2) is also important because of the 
considerations of fairness. In addition, diversity (3) is a precondition of tracking publicly 
justified moral principles, and (4) makes the rival moral positions more reflective.    
 
The fallacy of composition 
Let me remind the reader of the thought experiment that I suggested above. It was about 
creating the strongest possible court that consisted of 12 judges. If my argument is correct, 
we need a diverse court to maximise the epistemic performance of that institution. If the court 
sits en banc, the epistemic capacity of the institution is the same as the epistemic capacity of 
the judicial panel that delivers the decisions. That means that the logic of my argument 
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applies, for instance, to the US Supreme Court or the French Constitutional Council. 
However, it does not necessarily apply to the UK Supreme Court or the German 
Constitutional Court which sit in panels that do not comprise all judges of the court.    
Let me use again my thought-experiment to clarify this point. My argument was that 
although Amy is more competent than Bella, at a certain point, depending on the composition 
of the court, Bella can contribute more to the epistemic performance of the court than Amy. 
In that case, it is justified to appoint Bella and Bella deserves to be appointed. It is important 
to keep in mind, however, that Bella’s contribution to the epistemic performance of the court 
was determined partly by, and contingent on, the cognitive toolkit or skillset of the other 
members of the court. Hence, it can happen that Bella contributes more to the epistemic 
performance of the whole court than Amy, but in some cases, given the skills of the four 
other justices, it would be Amy who could maximise the performance of a particular panel of 
five justices and not Bella. 
This objection forces me to admit that my argument does not apply straightforwardly 
to all courts. The smaller the number of judges sitting in a panel, the weaker my argument 
becomes. However, I still maintain that the Equal Merit Principle is unattractive even in those 
cases where judges sit in relatively small panels, or the decision is made by a single judge. 
My position rests on two considerations. First, the above objection focuses exclusively on 
how judicial diversity affects the internal dialogue among the judges who actually sit in a 
particular case. But as I argued above, judges can also draw on the insights and arguments of 
other judges who are not involved in the pending case.  
Second, the objection proves only that the optimal trade-off between competence and 
diversity will be slightly different depending on whether we are supposed to maximise the 
epistemic performance of the whole court, or only a panel of it. One could argue that the 
smaller the panel is, the more important competence becomes as compared to diversity. 
However, the Equal Merit Principle would surely generate suboptimal results, since it does 
not allow us to make any trade-offs between competence and diversity. If we have to choose 
between a principle that never allows us to balance competence against diversity and one that 




In the introduction, I claimed that the ‘Solely on Merit Principle’ is either wrong, for the very 
same reasons as the Equal Merit Principle, or rather uninformative since it fails to give 
sufficient guidance to those who select judges. 
I argued above that diversity is an important epistemic asset and, therefore, appointing 
judges solely on the basis of merit, if merit is understood as the competence of the individual 
judge, is simply wrong. Although the proponents of the simple view contend that deviating 
from a purely competence-based appointment system would undermine the quality of the 
judiciary, the opposite is true: a purely competence-based system cannot be justified on 
epistemic grounds.     
If merit is understood as a function of the competence of an individual judge and the 
cognitive diversity of the court as a whole, then it is correct to say that judges should be 
appointed on merit. However, in that case, a judgment on merit simply reflects the outcome 
of a balancing exercise, but merit itself does not tell us anything interesting about the process 
of balancing. Competence and diversity are both important to maximise the epistemic 
performance of courts and finding the optimal trade-off between them should be at the heart 
of every sophisticated theory of judicial appointments.  
